Purpose -This paper discusses empirical research examining whether: 1) controlling owners' type affects cost of equity capital (COEC) and real earnings management (REM), 2) REM affects COEC, and 3) REM mediates the effect of controlling owners' type on COEC. Design/methodology/approach-The research uses a sample of 132 publicly listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the fiscal year that ends on December 31 in the year of 2011, 2012, and 2013 and the total observation consist of 396 firm-years. Cost of equity capital is estimated by using Ohlson Model, Real earnings management as mediating variable is measured by Roychowdhury model. Three models are used to calculate real activity manipulation based on operating activity, production cost, and discretionary expenditures. Control variables consist of corporate governance practices measured by corporate governance indices, ownership concentrated level measured by ownership ratio, firm's size measured by log total assets, and discretionary accruals measures by Modified Jones Model. Data used in this study is obtained from ICMD, Indonesian Stock Exchange database, and company annual reports. Findings -This research finds evidence that the ownership type affects cost of equity capital, and RCFO except private ownership. With exception for GOV, ownership type affects production costs-based real earnings management (RPE) but all ownership types affect discretionary expenditures-based real earnings management (RDE). Moreover, RCFO, RPE, and RDE affect cost of equity capital. Finally, this research reports that RCFO mediates the effect of each ownership type on cost of equity except for private ownership (PRIV), RPE mediates the effect of each ownership type on cost of equity capital except for private ownership (PRIV) and government ownership (GOV) and RDE mediates the effect of each ownership type on cost of equity capital. Originality/value -This study provides further evidence on the effect of controlling ownership on COEC and REM, the effects of REM on COEC, and evidence that REM mediates the effect of controlling owners' type on COEC.
Introduction
The ownership structure of most companies in the world are concentrated, in the form of pyramid, intercompany ownership, and are controlled by controlling shareholders ICEMA (La Porta et al. 1999 ). This phenomenon is also happened in developing countries like Indonesia (La Porta et al., 1999; Lukviarman 2004; Sanjaya 2010) . Such ownership structure characteristic likely leads to controlling owners' expropriation risk by sacrificing non-controlling interests. Controlling owners have a strong incentive to do expropriation or utilize their controlling right by switching firm's resources, especially in the weak law The risk of firm's resources takeover by controlling owners lead to a higher equity premium required by investors . Previous research find that ownership is associated with cost of equity (Aslan and Kumar 2012) and associated with bond yield-spreads and bond ratings (Boubakri and Ghouma 2010) . Family ownership is associated with trade-off between improving family control and limiting the growth of alternative financing (Wu et al. 2007 ). Cost of equity is significantly higher for family firms than non-family firms . We predict that the types of controlling ownership affect cost of equity capital (COEC).
The controlling shareholder's expropriation, insiders, and managers could be performed either explicitly or implicitly by using earnings management through both discretionary accrual and real activities (Crocker and ). Yet, the controlling shareholder's expropriation level may be unequal. The family controlling interests may take a more private benefit than that of non-family shareholders (Surifah, 2014 ; Boubakri and Ghouma 2010; Wu et al. 2007 ).
Therefore, this research predicts that the types of controlling ownership affect real earnings management (REM).
Discretionary accruals-based earnings management and real activity-based earnings management have economic consequences for the firms. They affect either firm's performance or firm's value (Roychowdhury 2006 ICEMA and overproduction are associated with higher bond yield spreads. This imply that credit rating agencies and bondholders perceive real earnings management (REM) as a credit risk-increasing factor and thus require high risk premiums (Ge and Kim, 2013) . This research predicts that REM affects cost of equity capital (COEC). The previous research report that the controlling ownership type affect cost of equity capital (COEC) and REM.
Moreover, the REM affects COEC. Therefore, this research assumes that controlling owners expropriate through REM which affect cost of equity capital. Therefore, this research predicts that the REM acts as a mediator for the association between controlling owners' type and COEC.
This research is important for some reasons. First, controlling owners' expropriation phenomena on firm's resources are common in the case of Indonesian firms, such as the acquisition case (Trust Magazine, 2003) , the liquidation of 16 banks and the operation suspend of seven banks in 1997. These cases are due to the weakness of corporate governance implementation (Zuang et al., 2000) . Second, previous research investigates the effect of REM on COEC had not involved controlling owners' type. In the case of concentrated ownership structure, earnings management is performed on behalf of controlling owners. This, of course, will be different in the case of a spread ownership structure, where such earnings management is performed on behalf of their own-interest. Third, this research reviews the three variables -controlling owners' type, REM, and COEC -in a single research model. It hopefully will provide a more precise picture about the level of controlling owners' expropriation and economic consequence for the firms. The research objectives are provide empirical evidences whether: 1) controlling owners' type affects COC and REM, 2) REM affects COEC, and 3) REM mediates the effect of controlling owners' type on COEC.
The main contribution of this study to the existing literature is that, to our knowledge, it is the first study to examine the association between controlling owners' type, REM and COEC. The results will enrich the existing literatures about the controlling owners' expropriation risks through REM and its effect on COEC. Previous studies investigates the effect of REM on COEC (Kim and Sohn, 2013; Ge and Kim, 2013) taking which will be responded by outside stakeholder which in turns increase COEC.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the extant literature and develops our research hypothesis. Section 3 describes sample and data sources, specifies our empirical model used for hypothesis testing, and explains how we measure our research variables, that is, the COEC, controlling owners' type, and REM. Section 4 presents the preliminary and main empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
This study uses agency theory which states that there is a separation of ownership (by principal) and control (by agent). This separation creates a conflict between principle and agent because the separation will give an incentive for agents to maximize their own utility and interest at the principle cost ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976 Earnings management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies (accruals) or real actions that affect earnings so as to achieve some specific reported earnings objective (Scott, 2012) . Earnings management consists of the choice of accounting policy (discretionary accruals) and real activities manipulation. Accruals management involves within-GAAP accounting choices that try to "obscure" or "mask" true economic performance (Dechow and Skinner, 2000) . Real activities manipulation (RM) occurs when managers undertake actions that change the timing or structuring of an operation, investment, and/or financing transaction in an effort to influence the output of the accounting system (Xu et al., 2007) . Real activities manipulation is a departure action from normal operational practices, motivated by managers' desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations. The objective of real earnings manipulation is to meet or beat an earnings benchmark (Roychowdhury 2006) . Real earnings management implies that manager deviates from an otherwise optimal plan of actions only to affect earnings, therefore, imposing cost to the firm (Ewert dan Wagenhofer, 2005) .
Several researches about real earnings management had been performed. Roychowdhurry (2006) investigates about the association between real activities manipulation and the likelihood of loss in annual financial statements. He finds evidence consistent with managers manipulating real activities to avoid reporting annual losses.
His research also finds evidence suggesting price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. Kang and Kim (2011) examine the association between corporate governance and real activity-based earnings management and extend it to firm performance. They find that the real activity-based earnings management is effectively controlled by a corporate governance system and that it has links between corporate governance and performance. Gunny (2010) identify firms that appear to engage a real activities manipulation (RM) to influence accounting system output so as to meet earnings benchmark and find that firm-years reflecting RM to just meet earnings benchmarks have higher subsequent firm performance. This result is consistent with managers attaining benefits that allow better future performance or signaling.
Other research about REM and AEM had performed by Zang (2012) Cost of capital is the expected return on a firm's stock (Lambert et al. 2007 ). Cost of capital is a function of dividend payout level, firm's growth, and earnings to price ratio (Botosan, 1997) . This definition is consistent with standard asset pricing models in finance (Fama and Miller, 1972) , and numerous studies in accounting that use discounted cash flow or abnormal earnings models to infer firms' cost of capital (Botosan, 1997) .
Cost of equity capital is calculated based on long-term financing available for the firm.
Long-term financing comes from four sources: (1) long-term debt, (2) preferred shares, 
Ownership Type and Earnings Management
Expropriation of controlling shareholders, insiders, and managers could be performed and hidden through both accrual earnings management and real activities earnings management. For instance, insiders cover private benefit taking by using accrual earnings management (Crocker and Slemrod, 2007) . Earnings management can also be performed through real activities such as transaction with affiliated companies (Thomas. Expropriation level of controlling owners is different to each other. Family controlling owners may take more private benefit than the others (Surifah, 2014 Real earnings management activities exacerbate the information quality of earnings used by outside investors, and thus the market demands a higher risk premium for these activities, which is incremental to the risk premium for the accrual-based earnings management. Moreover, Ge and Kim (2013) find that overproduction impairs credit ratings and that sales manipulation and overproduction are associated with higher bond yield spreads. These results imply that credit rating agencies and bondholders perceive real earnings management as a credit risk-increasing factor and thus require high risk premiums. Based on the description above, the hypothesis can be stated in alternative form as follows: 
Real Earnings Management and Cost of Equity Capital

Research Design
Sample Selection
The sample used in this research is firms listed at the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The sample was selected using the purposive sampling technique. The first requirement is that it is a public company listed at the IDX from 2011 to 2013. The second requirement is that those firms should in manufacturing industry. The third criterion is that these firms have publicly available information. The data came from three sources, Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD), www.idx.co.id, and company's website. The unit analysis used is firm-year.
Variable definition and Measurement
This Share price in the period t (Pt) is the average of three days observation, which are one day before financial statement publication (t-1), at the day of financial statement publication (t), and one day after financial statement publication (t+1). The main consideration for using three days windows is that there is time lag between financial statement submission date and financial publication which usually one day lags, and ICEMA short window will minimize confounding effect (Purwanto, 2012) . Earnings per share period t+1 is estimated using random walk model as follows:
Where: 
/ −1 = 0 + 1 (1/ −1 ) + 1 ( / −1 ) + 2 (Δ / −1 ) + 3 (Δ −1 / −1 ) + (4)
Where:
CFO /A −1 : Operating cash flows for the year t scaled by total assets for year t-1. α 1 (1/A −1 ): Intercept scaled by total assets for year t-1.
S /A −1 : Sales revenue in the year t scaled by total assets for year t-1. 
ΔS /A
Data Analysis
Model Specification
The main statistical method to test the hypotheses is the GLS regression. 
Data Analysis and Discussion
Based on the sampling process described, this study uses 132 firms in the year of 2011, 2012, and 2013 as data sample, so the total observation consist of 396 firmyears. Balanced data was used to perform GLS analysis. The first step in analysis is ICEMA to calculate descriptive statistics for each variable which are presented in Table 1 . The Mean for mediating variables are -0.003 for RCFO, -0.003 for RDE, and -0.002
for RPE show that the number is almost identical. This indicates that real earnings management, especially operating cash-based and discretionary-based has similar value. This also can be confirmed by median, maximum, and deviation standard values.
For RPE, although has almost similar mean value to that of RCFO and RDE, they have quite different value for median, maximum, and minimum.
Mean for CG is 12.85 which indicates that CG best practice implementation is still weak. This may because a part of items in CG index are not mandatorily. Therefore, public corporations have not given enough attention to such items. Moreover, market mechanism is not strong enough to push enforcement of CG best practices. Nam and Nam (2004) find that there is a little, if any, market mechanism as an instrument to control public companies in Indonesia, republic of Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia. These results show that COEC is correlated with each type of earnings management in that COEC negatively correlated with RCFO, but COEC positively correlated with RDE and RPE. Yet all of these correlations are significant and give initial support to hypotheses. Finally, the bivariate correlation will further tested with regression analysis.
Result
The regression analysis results to test the hypotheses are presented in Table 3 . We use several model to test our hypotheses. We uses model 6 in Table 3 ICEMA cost of equity capital? We suspect that this is because market less confident to familyowned-companies. Market is more confident to invest in non family-owned-companies, therefore cost of equity capital in non family-owned-companies lower than that of family-owned-companies. Some researchers find that family-controlled-companies are indicated to take private benefit more than non family-controlled-companies (Surifah, 2014; Boubakri and Ghoume, 2010; Wu et al., 2007) . In this situation, market will invest in family-owned-companies when they offer a higher return, and this in turn increases their cost of equity capital.
Hypotheses 2a which states that ownership type affects operating cash flows-based real earnings management (RCFO) is tested by model 7. The result is presented in column Model 7 in Table 3 . Hypotheses 2b which states that ownership type affects production costs-based real earnings management (RPE) is tested by model 8. The result is presented in column Model 8 in Table 3 . The variables of interests are FAM, GOV, PRIV, FORG, PUBL, and OWNC. The result shows a positive and significant coefficient in the level α = 0.01 (p = 0.000) for PRIV (0.865), FAM (1.352), FORG (0.381), PUBL (0.531) and insignificant for GOV. Therefore, with exception for GOV, it can be concluded that hypotheses 2b (H 2 ) is supported by the empirical data. These indicate that the higher private, family, foreign, and public ownership the higher is RPE, whereas government ownership does not have impact on RPE.
Hypotheses 2c which states that ownership type affects discretionary expendituresbased real earnings management (RDE) is tested by model 9. The result is presented in column Model 9 in Table 3 . The analysis shows that cash flow of family-owned companies and public companies are higher than that of private, government, and foreign companies.
Family-owned companies have higher abnormal cash flow and lower abnormal discretionary expenditures. This probably the family owned companies tend to have a higher ability to lower discretionary expenditures, and this in turn will the higher operating cash flows. Government-owned companies tend to have the higher discretionary expenditures, and this lower operating cash flow. We suspect that government issues certain policies which increase discretionary expenditures in order to hide their private benefit they have had taken. In private and foreign companies, discretionary expenditures and production cost tend to be higher which lower operating cash flow, whereas in public companies, discretionary expenditures and production are high but the operating cash flow is also high. This indicates that the most optimal condition is that in public companies. 
Hypotheses 3a which states that operating cash flow-based real earnings management (RCFO) affects cost of equity capital, hypotheses 3b which states that production costs-based real earnings management (RPE) affects cost of equity capital, and hypotheses 3a which states that discretionary expenditures-based real earnings management (RDE) affects cost of equity capital are tested by model 10 and the result is presented in column Model 10 in Table 3 . The variables of interests are RCFO, RPE, and RDE. The result shows a negative and significant coefficient in the level α = 0.01 (p = 0.000) for RCFO (-0.019) and positive and significant coefficient in the level α = 0.05 (p = 0.000) for RPE (0.350) and RDE (0.069). Therefore it can be concluded that hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c are supported by the empirical data. These indicate that real operating cash flow decrease cost of capital. It means that the higher the abnormal operating cash flow, the lower the cost of equity capital. This is happened because investors are able to watch that the companies have a high cash flow which means they are low-risk rate companies.
When the risk rate is low, investor will interest to invest although with low return. Real production costs (RPE) and real discretionary expenditures (RDE) positively affect cost of capital. This means that the higher the abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures, the higher the cost of equity capital. Abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures are indicators for company's operational inefficiency. Therefore, investors do not attract to invest to inefficient companies except they will get a high return. This of course will suffers the companies with increasing in cost of capital,
The statistical results confirm previous researches which find that real earnings management negatively affects future cash flows (Roychowdhury, 2006) , accrual-based ICEMA ICEMA earnings management is associated with cost of capital (Dechow et al., 1996 , Francis et al., 2004 Bharat et al., 2008; Gray et al, 2009; Utami, 2005) , earnings management also decreases long-term profitability (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005) , that managers will manipulate real activities to meet earnings target, even if it will decrease long-term firm's value Graham et al. (2005) , manipulating earnings experience significant increases in their costs of capital (Dechow et al. (1996) , poorer accruals quality is associated with larger costs of debt and equity (Francis et al., 2005) , and poor accrual quality is positively associated with high cost of quality (Gray et al., 2005) . Table 4 shows that family ownership (FAM), foreign ownership (FORG), and public ownership We also predict that corporate governance negatively affect cost of capital and real-earnings management. The analysis results in all columns at Table 3 show that CG's coefficients are positive. These do not confirm our predictions. We suspect that corporate governance practices are still ineffective in developing countries environment compare to that of in developed countries.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether: 1) controlling owners' type affects COEC and REM, 2) REM affects COEC, and 3) REM mediates the effect of controlling owners' type on COEC. The results indicate that the ownership type affects cost of equity capital, and hypotheses 1 (H1) is supported by the empirical data. The results also indicate that the ownership type affects RCFO except private ownership and therefore hypotheses 2a (H 2 ) is partly supported by the empirical data. With exception for GOV, hypotheses 2b (H 2 ) which states that ownership type affects production costs-based real earnings management (RPE) is also supported by the empirical data, moreover hypotheses 2c which states that ownership type affects discretionary expenditures-based real earnings management (RDE) is also supported by the empirical data.
Hypotheses 3a which states that operating cash flow-based real earnings manage- This research has implications. First, the results confirm the expectation that controlling owners' type affects COEC and REM. Practically, controlling owners suffers the higher risk and therefore they require the higher equity premium. Consequently, the different ownership type will affect COEC differently. Moreover, controlling ownership types with different interests do also affect REM differently. Second, the results also confirm that each type of REM affects COEC. Manipulation of earnings through production costs, operating cash flows, and discretionary expenditure could impair credit ratings and therefore they affect cost of equity capital. Third, the results also confirm that REM mediates the effect of controlling owners' type on COEC.
This research has limitations. The main limitation is that this research includes only data from manufacturing company. Consequently, analysis for each industry cannot be performed. This opens an opportunity to perform further research which involved more industry types. Another limitation is that this research involves data only from one developing country i.e. Indonesia. This probably could not give a big picture for similar research problem in other developing countries with different characteristics in term of regulation systems and their enforcement powers. Therefore further research could be done by involving data from other developing countries both in similar regions and different regions.
